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OF (UN )EQUAL JURISPRUDENTIAL




Abstract: The Supreme Court's recent Establishment Clause decisions
have framed neutrality and separationistn as competing principles. A
plurality of the Court views evenhanded neutrality as the superior
principle over separationism and the controlling model for Religion
Clause adjudication generally. A bare majority insists that the two
principles are of equal jurisprudential pedigree. So framed, neutrality
and separationism have been placed on an apparent collision course,
forcing Supreme Court justices as well as church-state scholars to choose
between one principle or the other. This Article proposes an alternative
view of the relationship between separationism and neutrality. When
viewed within its proper role and function, neutrality serves as an
adjunct to separationist'', and can only contribute a value consistent
with the history and purpose of the religion clauses by existing as a
subordinate principle.
INTRODUCTION
The current debate over the guiding principle for Religion
Clause adjudication—separationism or neutrality—may be winding
down.' Recent decisions by the Supreme Court in the Establishment
Clause arena have confirmed the importance of evenhanded neutral-
ity for adjudicating the constitutionality of public benefits and access
* © 2002, Dr. Steven K. Green. Dr. Steven K. Green is Associate Professor of Law at
Willamette University College of Law in Salem, Oregon. The title comes from Rosenberger u
Rector E..q' Visitors of the Uniu of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 849 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
According to Professor Esbeck, the debate over the interpretation of the no-
establishment principle has become one of the chief battle sites over who exercises cul-
tural authority in this nation. Quite simply, the Establishment Clause has become where
Americans litigate over the meaning of America." Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for
Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Baser' Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY 14. 1, 3 (1997)
(citations omitted).
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programs,2 effectively bringing that clause in line with the approach
the Court has taken with Free Exercise matters since 1990. 3 Neutrality
has emerged victorious from the doctrinal fray while separationism,
which has been on the ropes for two decades, is apparently down for
the count.
Separationism, the stalwart of church-state jurisprudence for
more than fifty years, was most visible as the standard in parochial
school funding and public school prayer cases—prohibiting both ac-
tivities4—and was controlling, at least at the lower court level, on is-
sues involving the public display of religious symbols and the govern-
ment utilization of religious imagery and functionaries to effectuate
government policies and goals . 3 But the impact of separationism was
much broader than these obvious categories. Pursuant to the Court's
"separationist" holdings, churches and religious organizations were
left alone to determine their own beliefs and governance, 6 were ac-
commodated in their practices, 7 and were exempted from taxation
and intrusive regulation.8 In exchange, religion was otherwise ex-
cluded from enjoying the benefits of extensive government sponsor-
ship—financial, psychic or otherwise.9 Equally important, separation-
ism disabled the government from opining on the merits of any
religious perspective. 19
Throughout this period (1947 to 1985), the Court sometimes
spoke in neutrality terms too, although commonly as a complement
2 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). See generally Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997).
1 See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (school funding). See generally Sch.
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (school prayer and Bible
reading).
5 See Allegheny County v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989);
Chabad-Lubavitch v. City of Burlington, 936 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991); Smith v. Albermarle
County, 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1989). See generally Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S.
116 (1982).
5 See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Mili-
vojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724, 725 (1976).
7 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987); NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 506 (1979).
8 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n. of N.Y, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). But see jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471
U.S. 290 (1985).
9 See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
10 Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 573; United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
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to separationism and often as an afterthought." In Everson v. Board of
Education, considered by many to be the archetypal separationist opin-
ion, the majority declared that the government could not exclude
"the members of any ... faith, because of their faith or lack of it, from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation,'" That statement,
declaring that all individuals were entitled to equal regard by their
government, irrespective of their religious belief or nonbelief, was
consistent with Everson's no-aid theory in that it distinguished general-
ized individual benefits from funding programs through which the
government purchases or promotes certain goods or services from or
through non-government institutions." The Court's later use of neu-
trality was often discordant, however. Following Everson, the high
court identified neutrality as a goal in apparently inconsistent rulings,
upholding tax exemptions for churches but prohibiting tax credits for
tuition at parochial schools.14
 Maintaining "neutrality" was also the
rationale for prohibiting school-sponsored prayer and Bible readings
but permitting student religious clubs on secondary school cam-
puses. 15
 In these earlier cases, however, the Court viewed neutrality as
a complement to separationism. In fact, the Court integrated neutral-
ity considerations into its Establishment Clause standard—the Lemon
test—by asking whether the government acted with the purpose of
advancing religion."
One explanation for the Court's uneven approach to neutrality is
that the concept is difficult to define. Neutrality is "a coat of many
colors," the second Justice Harlan once remarked, and the concept is
11 See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788, 792-93
(1973) ("pursue a course of neutrality toward religion"); Walt, 397 U.S. at 669-70 (refer-
ring to a position of "benevolent neutrality" that "derives from an accommodation of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses."); Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 251, 222,
("wholesome 'neutrality'").
12
 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). Justice Black, the author of Everson, would later dissent from
the Court's 1968 decision upholding the provision of secular textbooks to public and pa-
rochial schools, arguing that neutrality had its limits, especially where it resulted in state
finances "actively and directly assisting] the teaching and propagation of sectarian relig-
ious viewpoints"). Set Bd. of Educ, v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 253 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
13
 See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 781-82 (distinguishing generalized benefits from aid to relig-
ious institutions); Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-44 (same).
14 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788 (declaring that "our cases require the State to maintain an
attitude of 'neutrality,' neither 'advancing' nor 'inhibiting' religion."); Walt, 397 U.S. at
669 (referring to a regime of "benevolent neutrality").
12
 Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990); Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at
223.
Is See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23.
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open to many interpretations." The Court has used the term to rep-
resent quite distinct concepts—as a median between being pro- and
anti-religious, 18
 as a synonym for "secular," and as a form of even-
handed treatment—but most often in a conclusory manner. 19
 One
need only peruse the multiple opinions in Mitchell tt Helms, all offer-
ing divergent views of neutrality, to appreciate the confusion and divi-
sion that exists over this concept.° The scholarly literature on the sub-
ject has been equally diverse; some commentators assert that
neutrality is the complement to non-advancement while others claim
it is its antithesis 21 As Professor Douglas Laycock has observed, we can
"agree on the principle of neutrality without having agreed on any-
thing at all."22
Beginning in the mid-1980s, a more "coherent" notion of neu-
trality began to emerge from the Court—or at least from its more
conservative members.23 This version of neutrality, of evenhanded
treatment of religious entities under generally applicable laws, has
come to be viewed as the counterpoise to the separationist "non-
17 Allen, 392 U.S. at 249 (Harlan, J., concurring).
18 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) ("Government in our democ-
racy must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not
be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of nonreligion; and it many not aid, foster, or
promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant op-
posite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and religion and nonreligion.").
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1993) (evenhanded); Muel-
ler v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983) (evenhanded); Meek, 421 U.S. at 372 (secular); Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (median); Allen, 392 U.S. at 245 (secular); Everson,
330 U.S. at 18 (median). See Justice Souter's discussion in Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 878-84.
2° See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836-41 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 877-85 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
21 Compare Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY
U. 43 (1997) [hereinafter Underlying Unity), with Esbeck, supra note 1, at 4. See generally
Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech
Values—A Critical Analysis of 'Neutrality Theory' and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & Pus. PoL'v 243 (1999); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty:
From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1 (2000);
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAtn.
L. REV. 993 (1990) [hereinafter Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality]; Michael W.
McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146 (1986); Dhananhai
Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1998); Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares and Voucher Payments: Problems of Government Neutral-
ity, 28 CONN. L. REV. 243 (1996); John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 48 U. Prrrs. L. REV. 83 (1986).
22 Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality, supra note 21, at 994.
23 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 608-09 (1988); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 490-91 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Mueller, 463 U.S. at
398-99.
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advancement" position in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 24 In
Widmar v. Vincent (1981) and Board of Education v. Mergens (1990),
both involving religious group use of public educational facilities, the
Court looked to the general access allowed under the programs and
used their neutrality to diffuse Establishment Clause concerns." The
same rationale appeared last term when the Court upheld a religious
group's use of elementary school classrooms immediately following
the school day, with the equal availability of access negating impres-
sionability concerns."
The Court took neutrality to the next level in a series of educa-
tional benefits cases by apparently elevating it to the status of a free-
standing constitutional/adjudicatory principle. 21 "[S] tate programs
that are wholly neutral in offering educational assistance to a class
defined without reference to religion do not violate (the Establish-
ment Clause]," Justice Powell boldly asserted in 1986. 28 But it was in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia that the Court
made the central role of neutrality most clear." There, the Court
highlighted neutrality as the justification for permitting funding of a
religious magazine while simultaneously providing little discussion of
its earlier separationist holdings to the contrary." "The guarantee of
neutrality is respected, and not offended," Justice Kennedy wrote,
"when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded
policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and view-
points, including religious ones, are broad and diverse."'
More recently, in Mitchell, Justice Thomas declared that, pursuant
to the principle of neutrality, "if the government, seeking to further
some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, with-
out regard to religion, to all who adequately further that purpose,
24
 Of course, the neutrality theory has had an even greater impact in the Free Exercise
context with the 1990 decision of Employment Division u Smith, 494 U.S. 872, a decision
generally deplored by separationists and accommodationists alike. For a discussion of its
relevance in this context, see text accompanying notes 139-144.
25 See Mergens, 496 U.S. 226; Widmar v. Vincent, 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
" See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114.
27 See generally Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8; VVi Hers, 474 U.S. 481 at 490-91 (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398-99.
22 Witten, 474 U.S. at 490-91 (Powell, J., concurring).
" 515 U.S. at 859.
22 Id at 839.
31 Id. Justice Kennedy did limit the reach of the neutrality principle by implying a dif-
ferent resolution had the Court confronted a case 'where, even under a neutral program
that includes nonsectarian recipients, the government is making direct money payments to
an institution or group that is engaged in religious activity." Id. at 842.
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then it is fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only has
the effect of furthering that secular purpose."32 These decisions all
indicate a growing view that evenhanded neutrality is not merely one
element in the Court's analysis but is becoming the sole determining
factor. This trend has led Justice O'Connor to criticize the plurality's
reliance on neutrality, calling their formula "a rule of unprecedented
breadth," one that comes close "to assigning that factor singular hn-
portance in the future adjudication of Establishment Clause chal-
lenges."33 Yet, despite her criticism of the plurality's approach, 38
O'Connor agrees that "neutrality is an important reason for uphold-
ing government-aid programs against Establishment Clause chal-
lenges. "5
Although opinions differ as to the meaning of neutrality or its
dispositiveness, there can be no doubt that the principle now com-
mands the Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence. A plurality of the
Court views evenhanded neutrality as the superior principle over
separationism and the controlling model for Religion Clause adjudi-
cation generally. 39 The remainder of the justices view neutrality as an
important and sometimes indispensable principle—a prerequisite for
the constitutionality of many programs—although not serving as the
sole consideration." As Justice O'Connor remarked in Rosenberger,
neutrality toward religion is of "equal historical and jurisprudential
pedigree" with the principle of separation. 38 Paralleling the scholarly
debate, therefore, division on the Court apparently turns on whether
neutrality is supreme and dispositive for resolving religion clause dis-
putes or whether it merely has equivalent value and status with separa-
tionism when adjudicating such controversies.
This article proposes a third view of the relationship between
separationism and neutrality. Rather than being principles of "equal
historical and jurisprudential pedigree,"39 neutrality and separation-
32 530 U.S. at 810 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion).
"td. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34 According to Justice O'Connor, the Court's earlier holdings touting the importance
of neutrality "provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious activi-
ties.' Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 847 (O'Connor, J., concurring); accord Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at
2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
33
 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 838 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36 See id, at 809-14.
37 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 838
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 883-84 (Souter, J., dissenting).
" Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
39 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ism are not of equal weight or value. Instead, when viewed within its
proper role and function, neutrality serves as an adjunct to separa-
tionism, and can only contribute a value consistent with the history
and purposes of the religion clauses by existing as a subordinate prin-
ciple. The Court and scholars have thus erred in elevating neutrality
to an equipoise with separationism.
This Article begins by considering the purposes and role of sepa-
rationism, a principle that has generally been short-changed by con-
temporary scholars.° It then briefly examines the historical treatment
of religion by government for consistency with the principle of neu-
trality.41
 Part III argues that, based on the history and a purpose of the
religion clauses, neutrality is an inadequate organizing principle for
First Amendment jurisprudence—that, at best, it fulfills a supportive
function.42
 The Article concludes by offering a framework under
which neutrality is applied in a manner that is not only consistent with
separationism but also supportive of it.°
I. DEFINING SEPARATIONISM
The impending demise of separationism, and the concomitant
ascension of neutrality, has been the subject of scholarly examination
for several years. As far back as 1994, leading church-state scholar Ira
Lupu—no fan of permissive accommodation of religion 44—proposed
that we were witnessing the "Lingering Death of Separationism."° In
Professor Lupu's view, the separationist approach relies on an out-
dated world view based on a foregone Protestant hegemony—a per-
spective that is out of touch with contemporary conflicts facing the
Court and at tension with claims of equality and neutrality toward re-
ligion.* Professor Lupu's understanding of the separationist perspec-
40 See infra notes 44-92 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 93-130 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 131-144 and accompanying text.
4s See infra notes 145-157 and accompanying text.
44 See generally Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L REV. 743
(1992); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991).
45 Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 230, 230
(1994).
46 See id. at 231, 249. Professor Lupu has adhered to his view of separationism as an
anachronism in his more recent scholarship. See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle,
Giannella Lecture: The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 Vim-
L. REV. 37 (2002); Ira C. Lupu, Tb Control Faction and Protest Liberty: A General Theory of the
Religion Clauses, 7j. CorrrEmP. LEGAL IsstrEs 357 (1996).
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tive is decidedly cramped, however, with him describing separationism
as "a doctrine of secular privilege at its heart," under which "the pub-
lic arena is for secular argument only."47 Indeed, It] he separationist
premise of thoroughly privatized religion is symbolically threatened
even if sectarian forces merely occupy private space."45 While not all
separationist-leaning scholars are ready to surrender the perspective,
many share Professor Lupu's constricted view of separationism. 49
Professor Lupu's ambivalence toward separationism" pales, how-
ever, when compared to the vitriol directed at the perspective by sev-
eral other scholars. Critics have accused the separationist approach of
promoting discrimination against religious institutions, of marginaliz-
ing religious perspectives and approaches to normative issues, and
otherwise creating a climate of hostility towards religion 51 Others,
including members of the Court, have questioned the historical basis
for separationism or attempted to taint it with an earlier anti-Catholic
bias 5s
 By emphasizing the more visible aspects of separationisni, these
views have given short-shrift to the "spacious conception" of the prin-
ciple as well as its historical understanding and purposes."
The theory of separationism, though central to the Court's juris-
prudence for at least forty years, has always lacked a coherent
definition. At its most basic level, separationisni means the singling
out of religion for distinctive treatment. Perhaps the most familiar
and expansive statement of the principle appears in Everson tt Board of
Education, where Justice Black declared that the government may not
47 Lupu, supra note 45, at 249.
48 Id. at 250.
" See generally Stephen G. Gey, Why is Religion Special? Reconsidering the Accommodation of
Religion Under Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 75 (1990); Suzanna
Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CocrEmP. LEGAL. ISSUES 473 (1996); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Exchange; Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religion and Liberal Democracy,
59 U. Cm. L. REV. 195 (1992).
5° In fairness to Professor Lupu, he sees a continuing, important role for separation-
ism in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Lupu, supra note 46, at 370-71 (arguing
that the separationist approach should control in the areas of government speech, gov-
ernment-controlled programs such as public schools and disputes over church property
and doctrine).
51 See STEPHEN V. MONSMA, POSITIVE NEUTRALITY 68-73 (1993); Carl H. Esbeck,
Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and the Establishment Clause, 13 NO-
TRE DAME J.L. ETurcs & Pus. POL'Y 285, 289-91 (1999); Esbeck, supra note 1, at 6-20.
" See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 828-29 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852-63 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Wallace v. jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, j., dissenting); ROBERT L. Coat), SEPARATION OP
CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 8, 11-15, 17 (1982).
53 SeeMcColluni v. 13d. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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"pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, . . . prefer one re-
ligion over another . . . [nor] force [or] influence a person to go to or
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a be-
lief or disbelief in any religion." 54 As is evident from the passage, this
view of separationism encompassed more than merely prohibiting
state financial aid to religious institutions; this view embraces what I
would term "non-impact" principles: lessening government impact on
and interference with religious institutions and religious decision
making.55
This aspect to separationism, however, was overshadowed by what
became Black's sound-bite for the concept:
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or prac-
tice. . . . In the words of Jefferson, the clause against estab-
lishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of
separation between Church and State." 56
The controlling significance of this phrase was only bolstered by the
dissenters who, in chastising the majority for its inconsistent holding,
added that the Constitution required a "complete," "uncompromis-
ing," and "permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity
and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of pub-
lic aid or support for religion."57
 Later refinements of this view of
separationism were expressed as prohibiting "sponsorship, financial
support, [or] active involvement of the sovereign in religious activ-
ity."59
 Though the Court occasionally abjured the apparent absolutism
of Everson by inserting modifiers such as "benevolent,"59 it always re-
" Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
55 Everson contains additional statements of the same tenor: "Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious or-
ganizations or groups and vice versa." Id. at 16.
"Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1890)).
57 Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting); IS 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
" Walz v. Tax	 of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
55 Id. at 669. "No perfect or absolute separation is really possible." Id. at 670; accord
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (noting that the Court's holdings "do not
call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an
absolute sense, T) he line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct,
and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.").
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turned to Black's "no-aid" statement as representing the heart of
separationism well into the 1980s.°
The problem with the Everson image of separationism was that it
was a mirage—it never existed, neither in Everson nor even in the later
funding cases. During the high-water years of separationism, 1970-
1978, the Court continued to qualify its rhetoric while permitting lim-
ited forms of public aid to religious institutions, much to the chagrin
of separationist groups such as the ACLU, Americans United for
Separation of Church and State and PEARL. Tax exemptions for
churches—despite their acknowledged subsidy effect—construction
and program grants for religious colleges, and numerous forms of
public aid to parochial schools passed under—or more correctly,
through—the separationist radar screen.° Even in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
a holding that memorialized the separationist standard into a three-
part test, the Court equivocated by insisting that "total separation" was
not possible and the wall of separation was at best a "blurred, indis-
tinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a
particular relationship."62
This is not to suggest that the no-aid principle is inconsequential
as a value. On the contrary, the no-aid principle rightly defines the
core of separationism by reinforcing many of the values that both tra-
dition and experience have demonstrated as crucial to the Republic.
Public funding of religious worship and education is inherently coer-
cive of freedom of conscience, inevitably inequitable in its results,
corrosive in its effect on its recipients, and ultimately leads to relig-
ious dissension.° Justice Souter has summed up the principle thus:
"Using public funds for the direct subsidization of preaching the word
6° See Allegheny County v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989);
Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 381, 393 (1985).
61 See Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wohnan v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 679 (1971); Walz, 397 U.S. at 675-76.
62 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
63 See Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson's Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), in 2
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 73 ( John Wilson & Donald L. Drakentan eds.,
1987) ("Elio compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves and abhors is sinful and tyrannical ... it tends also to cor-
rupt the principles of that very religion it is meant to encourage."); James Madison, Memo-
rial and Remonstrance (1785), in 2 CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra, at 69
("the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his prop-
erty for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other es-
tablishment in all cases whatsoever."); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 869-72 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
2002]	 Of Un(Equal) Jurisprudential Pedigree 	 1121
is categorically forbidden under the Establishment Clause, and if the
Clause was meant to accomplish nothing else, it was meant to bar
[such] use of public money."64
Despite its centrality to separationism, the no-aid principle has
never represented more than the concept's most visible core. The
Court has identified a multiplicity of values furthered by separation-
ism. First and foremost, separationism has at its base the protection of
religious liberty through the prevention of government interference
with religious belief, practice, or doctrine.65
 This impulse has had two
strains, the first to protect individual liberty against government coer-
cion and the second to protect the autonomy and independence of
religious bodies. The Framers identified both as fruits from the tree
of separation. The legacy of official use of religion as a tool of oppres-
sion was familiar to the Framers. "Who does not see," wrote James
Madison, "that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any
particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects." 66 The
Framers' concern with coercion did not end with religious assess-
ments. Madison and Thomas Jefferson believed that the power to pre-
scribe any religious exercise, whether by mandate, suggestion or ex-
ample, was inherently coercive. Religion "can be directed only by
reason or conviction, not by force or violence," Madison wrote. 67
 Jef-
ferson insisted that to require a person to support even his own faith
was "sinful and tyrannical" and deprived him of his "comfortable lib-
erty. "68
Of only slightly lesser concern for these Framers was the corro-
sive effect of government on religious institutions. Establishments
"tend[ed] also to corrupt the principles of that very religion it is in-
tended to encourage,"69
 and led to "an unhallowed perversion of the
means of salvation."70
 Jefferson viewed separation as thus forbidding
114 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
66
 See generally Douglas Laycock, Thwards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981).
o Madison, supra note 63, at 69.
67 Id. at 68-69.
66 Jefferson, supra note 63, at 73.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller ( Jan. 23, 1808), in 2 CHURCH
AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 63, at 79.
7° Madison, supra note 63, at 70.
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the government from "intermeddling with religious institutions, their
doctrines, discipline or exercises."71
Based on this impulse, it should not be surprising that some of
the earliest references to separation appeared in those cases consider-
ing judicial review of church doctrine and polity.72 That principle was
summed up in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral where the Court
identified "a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an inde-
pendence from secular control or manipulation—in short, power to
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine."" Although the
basis for the Court's church-doctrine cases may rest in the Free Exer-
cise Clause, 74 the principle of non-interference emanates from the
Establishment Clause as well. 75 On one level, this concern can be
termed as non-entanglement, but limiting the concept to entangle-
ment would be shortsighted; disengagement is more accurate. As Pro-
fessor Laycock has concluded, "separation is and has always been a
means of maximizing religious liberty [and] of minimizing govern-
ment interference with religion."76
Madison and Jefferson's interest in preserving religious exercise
and church autonomy went beyond protecting religious liberty to
more pragmatic concerns that had immediate benefits to the new
government. On the one hand, the Framers believed that faith could
only be realized if achieved voluntarily, without encouragement by
71 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller, supra note 69, at 79 ("I do not
believe it is for the interest of religion to invite the civil magistrate to direct its exercises, its
disciplines, or its doctrines . „ .").
72 See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S.
94, 114 (1952); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (1878); Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 728-29
(1871).
73 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116.
74
 Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Blue Hull Ment'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449, 450 (1969); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 107, 108.
75 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S.
490, 501 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976);
Blue Hull Mena Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449 (all relying on the First Amendment
and non-entanglement).
76 Underlying Unity, supra note 21, at 46. To be sure, in its more recent church dispute
cases the Court ruled that, where possible, courts should apply "neutral principles of law"
to resolve intra-church controversies. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03. Still, the Court applied
the neutral principles approach in a manner that recognized and protected the distinct-
iveness of religious entities: "the neutral principles [of law] approach ... promises to free
civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and
practice." Id.
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temporal powers.77
 On the other hand, they recognized that the per-
petuation of the new Republic would depend in part on the virtue of
its citizens." While men would never become angels, thus necessitat-
ing structural checks and limitations on the accumulation of power,"
virtue was no less indispensable. For government to take full or even
primary responsibility for ensuring virtue, however, would risk advanc-
ing or favoring particular religious viewpoints over others and invite
religious dissension.88 In addition, history had demonstrated that
government-promoted religions were inevitably corrupt and lacked
the purity upon which virtue depended.81
 Thus religion, rather than
government, would be the primary vehicle for instilling virtue. 82 Yet,
for religion to be able to provide this necessary function, it needed to
be independent from government.88
 As a result, the impulse for pro-
tecting religious exercise was as pragmatic as it was altruistic and fo-
cused in no small degree on the benefits that flowed to republican
society, as much as on the benefits to religion itself. A corrupted relig-
ion could not provide the purity of virtue on which the nation de-
pended.
This is where the analysis of some scholars falls short. Separation-
ism does not covet a "thoroughly privatized religion" but instead
needs a vibrant religious culture to ensure its vision of a secular Re-
public." A non-corrupted religious community—able to promote vir-
tue and religious values—acts as a surrogate for the government, free-
ing it of responsibility to perform those duties itself. At the same time,
a vibrant religious culture releases pressure on the government to act
religiously, serving as an escape valve against those who insist on a
visible degree of religious expression in society. If the secular ideal is
the preferred model and closest to the Framers' intent, as I believe it
77 Letter from James Madison to Jasper Adams (1833), in 2 CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 63, at 80.
" See GoitooN S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
425-29 (1998).
79 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10,51 ( James Madison).
80 Madison, supra note 63, at 69,71.
81 Id, at 70 ("[E]clesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and
efficacy of religion, have had a contrary operation."); Letter from James Madison to Ed-
ward Livingston (Jul. 10, 1822), in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 82-83 (Robert
S. Alley, ed., 1985) (asserting that "Religion flourishes in greater purity, without than with
the aid of [government).")
82 Woox, supra note 78, at 425-29.
°3 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV, 1410, 1416 (1990).
" See Lupu, supra note 45, at 250.
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is, then religion must be protected from government corruption and
influence in order for it to perform its essential functions. It is this
impulse, and not paternalism, that underlies the separationist argu-
ment that religion must be protected from the corrupting effect of
government funding. Government has an important self-interest irre-
spective of whether religion is willing to "take the shackles with the
shekels."
The values advanced by separation do not end with the preven-
tion of coercion and the protection of religious liberty, purity, and
autonomy. As the above discussion demonstrates, other important
values are advanced by separationism: ensuring religious and secular
equality, preventing the accumulation of power by one religion or a
union of religions and any alignment thereof with government, allevi-
ating dissension among religions through competition for benefits or
favoritism, and protecting the legitimacy and integrity of both gov-
ernment and religion s5 Of arguably greater concern for James Madi-
son than protecting religious exercise was his aversion to religious ma-
jorities and the deleterious effect that they had on both civil liberties
and government.86 Madison saw a value in religious equality beyond
simply protecting the liberty interests of religious minorities. 87 In his
Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison identified the value of a society
based on "equal conditions," with people retaining "equal tide to the
free exercise of Religion according to the dictates of Conscience." 88
"Brownstein, supra note 21, at 256-67 ("Equality and freedom of speech interests are
simply too essential a part of the constitutional framework relating to religion to be dis-
missed as irrelevant or secondary."); Lupu, supra note 46, at 360 (discussing "the Religion
Clauses' other animating concerns—to protect religious equality and to control religious
factionalism ...."); Sullivan, supra note 49, at 197-99.
86 Federalist 51 states this concern most clearly: "In a free government, the security for
civil rights must be the same as for religious rights. It consists in one case in the multiplic-
ity of interests, and in the other, in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both
cases will depend on the number of interests and sects." THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 324 (Ros-
siter ed., 1961).
87 In a letter to Thomas Jefferson during the fight over ratification of the Constitution,
Madison warned that "[i]n our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the
Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of
Government contrary to the sense or its constituents, but from acts in which the Govern-
ment is the mere instrumentality of the major number of the constituents." Letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at 1:564
(James Morton Smith ed., 1995). This statement follows immediately on an extended dis-
cussion about the need for a bill of rights to prevent religious tests and establishments. Id.
B8
 Memorial and Remonstrance, inJAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 81,
at 57.
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Responding to those who saw religious liberty as the sole value of the
religion clauses, Madison countered that "[w]hilst we assert for our-
selves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion
which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal free-
dom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which
has convinced us."89
 Complementing Madison's concern for equal
conditions was his aversion to a consolidation of religious groups.
Madison maintained that liberty and republican government would
be furthered through "the multiplicity of sects." 90 The converse to
consolidation was the threat of competition, dissension and strife
among religious bodies, something the Framers had witnessed
firsthand. Preventing government support of religion, even where at-
tempted on an evenhanded basis, would diffuse these potentially de-
structive forces.91
 Finally, Madison viewed the religion clauses as en-
suring the integrity of both government and religion, writing that
religious establishments produce a "spiritual tyranny on the ruins of
Civil authority," while they undermine the "purity and efficacy of Re-
ligion."92
Separationism therefore encompasses much more than a rule
against aiding or supporting religious enterprises. Separationism pro-
tects religious liberty and the autonomy of religious institutions, en-
sures that government will not impact religious choices, guarantees
religious equality and equal treatment of religion, prevents factional
strife and the accumulation of power by religion, and finally protects
the integrity of religion and secular government. As can be seen,
evenhanded treatment of religion represents only one aspect of the
myriad values that inform the spacious concept of separationism.
1/9 Id. The theme of religious equality as distinct from religious liberty runs throughout
the Memorial. See id. at 56 (expressing concern that '`the majority may trespass on the
rights of the minority"); id. at 58 (declaring that a "just Government" must protect "every
Citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand ...."); id. at 59-60
(reaffirming the "'equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according
to the dictates of conscience'").
op See FEDERAL/ST Nos. 10, 51 (lames Madison).
° I See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 (noting that "political division along religious lines was
one of the principle evils which the First Amendment was intended to protect."); FEDERAL-
IST No. 10 ( James Madison); Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 88, at 58-59; see also
Marti A. Hamilton, Power; the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807, 832
(1999); Lupu, supra note 46, at 357.
92 See Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 88, at 58; see also Detached Memoranda, in
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 81, at 90 (describing the constitutional
"separation between Religion & Govt" as "IsProngly guard[ing] ... [against] the danger
of encroachments by Ecclesiastical Bodies").
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II. THE DISTINCTIVE TREATMENT OF RELIGION
Separationism, at its most bask level, presumes that government
should, and at times, must, treat religion distinctively. Conversely,
evenhanded neutrality toward religion requires that government treat
religious entities and individuals the same as non-religious entities
with respect to participation in government programs and the dis-
bursement of government benefits. 93 Underlying neutrality theory
therefore is the assumption that religion is no different from other
theories, philosophies or motivations. As Professor Daniel Conkle has
termed it, evenhanded neutrality "belie [s] the claim that religion is
distinct and distinctly important."94
One would expect, however, that for such a theory to command
favor among a majority of the Court, it would find basis in our histori-
cal understanding and legal treatment of religion. Yet, in stark con-
trast to the notion of separationism, government neutrality toward
religion is ahistorical. Indeed, the Framers viewed religion as distinct
and distinctly important, and thus deserving of special treatment and
protection 95 The historical and legal record from the founding pe-
riod through the nineteenth century indicates that treating religion
equally or similarly to its non-religious counterparts was a foreign no-
tion.
The Framers did not view religion as simply another philosophi-
cal or ideological system. According to Madison, religion in particular
was "exempt from [the] cognizance" of civil government. 98 Each per-
son was bound to render homage to "the Creator . . . as he believes to
be acceptable to him; this duty is precedent, both in order of time
and in degree of obligation, to the claims of civil society."97 The Fram-
ers universally recognized and accepted religion's unique character
and position in the new nation.98
 All of the original states, including
those that abolished religious assessments for the support of church
establishments, maintained laws that preferred religion generally or
95 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-10 (2000).
Conkle, supra note 21, at 2.
95 See hi. See generally Lupu Sc Tuttle, supra note 46, at 38; McConnell, supra note 83, at
1415.
96 Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Mar. 19, 1823), in JAMES MADISON
ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 81, at 84.
97
 Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 88, at 56.
" See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 563 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Foremost,
these early leaders accorded religious exercise a special status."). See generally EDWIN S.
GAUSTAD, FAITH OF OUR FATHERS: RELIGION AND THE NEW NATION (1987).
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Christianity in particular, and afforded religion and religiously-based
obligations special treatment 99
 A majority of state constitutions ex-
pressly referred to the importance of religion or piety in maintaining
civic virtue, while those of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hamp-
shire, Vermont, Maryland, South Carolina and Georgia provided for
financial support of Christian ministers through multiple religious
establishments."'" The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 provided
that:
[MI orality and piety, rightly grounded on evangelical princi-
ples, will give the best and greatest security to the govern-
ment, and will lay in the hearts of men the strongest obliga-
tions to due subjection; and...the knowledge of these, is
most likely to be propagated through a society by the institu-
tion of public worship of the Deity, and public instruction in
morality and religion."'
More common in the early constitutions were provisions requiring
religious (usually Protestant) belief for public office-holding and re-
ligious oaths for jury duty, court testimony and other legal transac-
tions. 102 Several states also barred clergy from public office-holding or
serving in their legislatures."5 Conversely, state laws provided protec-
tion for religious worship from outside annoyance or interference.
Finally, all states retained or reenacted laws regulating conduct ac-
cording to a Christian standard: Sabbath desecration, blasphemy, pro-
fane swearing, fornication and bastardy. 104
99
 THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 134-92 (1986); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ES-
TABLISHMENT CLAUSE 25-62 (1986).
100 LEVY, supra note 99, at 25-62. Although the constitutions of Maryland, South Caro-
lina and Georgia allowed for multiple establishments, none of those states enacted author-
izing legislation. Id. at 47. All three states rescinded such authority in later constitutions.
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 800-01,1702,3264 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed.,
1909).
101 N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. VI, reprinted in THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 100, at 2454.
102 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS! THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS
13-44 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
103
 DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 29; GA. CONST. of 1789, art. I, § 18; N.Y. CONST. of 1777,
art. 39; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. 21.
104
 Religious tests: Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina; Free exercise restrictions on non-Protestants or non-Christians: Maryland,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina; Clergy disqualifications: Dela-
ware, Georgia, New York, South Carolina. THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 100, passim; GAUSTAD, supra note 98, at 161-74.
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Beyond merely distinguishing religion in their laws, states fre-
quently exempted churches and religiously motivated conduct from
the strictures of generally applicable laws. Religious exemptions from
the taking of oaths or serving in the military were common." 5 As Pro-
fessor Michael McConnell has demonstrated, the language of many
state constitutions protected religious belief and practice to the extent
that those actions did not rise to "civil injury or outward disturbance
of others."106 Such language confirms the expectation that some relig-
iously motivated actions would be immune from obedience to other-
wise neutral laws, until the actions threatened public peace and
•
safety."7 As Oliver Ellsworth, future Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, wrote during the 1787 Connecticut ratifying conven-
tion:
Civil government has no business to meddle with the private
opinions of the people. If I demean myself as a good citizen,
I am accountable, not to man, but to God, for the religious
opinions I embrace . . .. But while I assert the rights of relig-
ious liberty, I would not deny that the civil power has a right,
in some cases, to interfere in matters of religion. It has the
right to prohibit and punish gross immoralities and impie-
ties; because the open practice of these is of evil example
and detriment.' 08
Courts similarly found religious exemptions from laws of general
application. In the 1813 case of Guardians of the Poor tt Greene, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a Methodist minister was ex-
empt from serving as official town guardian, despite him otherwise
meeting the qualifications for office and the lack of an express ex-
emption in the law."9 As a court later in the century noted: "ministers
of the various denominations are exempted from the performance of
many public duties on account of the sacred character of their voca-
tion, as jury, road and military duty, such as devolves upon the great
103 McConnell, supra note 83, at 1467-69.
106 Id. at 1461-62.
1°7 Id. Although disagreement exists over the extent to which the early states exempted
religiously motivated conduct from generally applicable laws, see generally Philip A. Ham-
burger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 915 (1992), that debate does not detract from the fact that state constitutions and
laws viewed religion and religious entities as distinct from similarly situated conduct and
institutions of a secular character.
108 THE DEBATE oN THE CoNsTrruTioN 1:524 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
109 See generally Guardian' of the Poor v. Greene, 5 Binn. 554 (Pa. 1813).
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body of the citizens."110
 Early legal writers such as Nathan Dane and
Joseph Story affirmed the legal distinctiveness of religion and sup-
ported laws for the protection and promotion of religious piety."
Later treatise writers such as Thomas Cooley and Christopher Tiede-
man, while more circumspect about the government's ability to
affirmatively promote religion, were no less assertive about the
uniqueness of religion and religious institutions under the law.u 2
At the same time that religion was singled out for special treat-
ment, it was commonly denied the opportunity to participate in neu-
tral benefits and programs. As noted, several states disqualified clergy
from election to public office. 113
 Similarly, in February 1811, Presi-
dent Madison vetoed two congressional bills that would have provided
land and financial grants to churches, even though grants to secular
counterparts were common?" The most notable disqualification of
religion in the nineteenth century, however, was the exclusion of
Catholic and other parochial schools from receiving public funding
under state and local common school funds.u 5
 While this latter dis-
qualification can be tied in part to nativist and anti-Catholic senti-
ments, 116
 the principle behind excluding religious schools from re-
ceiving public dollars predated the rise of Catholic parochial
schooling and reflected a prevailing sentiment about the distinctive
character of religion . 117
110
 First Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Atlanta, 76 Ga. 181, 194 (1886).
111 See NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 664-
84 (1824); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
698-703 (1833).
112 THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 580-97 (4th ed.
1878); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A 'TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES 156-88 (1886).
115
 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (noting that eleven of the thirteen
original states disqualified clergy from various types of public office-holding).
114 See Veto Messages to Congress February 21 &' 28, 1811, infAmEs MADISON ON RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, supra note 81, at 79-80.
115 See People ex rel. Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum Soc. v. Bd. of Educ., 13 Barb.  400
(N.Y.S. 1851); DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS 20-76 (1974).
116
 RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE, 1800-1860, at 1-52 (1938);
Vincent P. Lannie, Alienation in America: The Immigrant Catholic and Public Education in Pre-
Civil War America, 32 REV. OF POL. 503-21 (1970).
117
 WILLIAM OLAND BOURNE, HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SOCIETY OF NEW YORK
103 (1870); RAVITCH, supra note 115, at 20-22. See generally Holy Trinity Church v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892); Steven K. Green, Justice David Josiah Brewer and the 'Christian
Nation' Maxim, 63 Ass. L. REv. 427, 427 (1999).
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The nineteenth century attitude about the distinct legal position
of religion is aptly summed up in the 1892 Supreme Court case of
Holy Trinity Church v. United States.u 8 There, a prestigious New York
City Episcopal church was fined for violating an immigration law after
hiring a British cleric as its new rector. 119 In reversing the fine, a
unanimous Court held that the statute had been misapplied because
Congress had never intended the law to prohibit the hiring of "minis-
ters of the gospel, or, indeed, of any class whose toil is of the brain."'"
Although the Court read an exception into the neutral law that
benefitted interests other than religion, the opinion made clear that
the statute interfered with the unique status of religion in American
society.'" According to Justice David Brewer, the immigration law
could not apply to the minister because America was a "Christian na-
tion" where the law recognized the importance of Christianity and
accommodated its practice. 122 Brewer quoted extensively from colo-
nial charters and state constitutional provisions that acknowledged
God or recognized Christianity. 1" He also pointed to cases where
judges had declared Christianity to be part of the common law. 124
Other evidence of the special legal status was found in the existence
of oaths referencing God, the protection of the Sabbath, and the pub-
lic acknowledgments of Christianity. 125 There was no dissonance in
these declarations, Brewer insisted. 126 They "affirm and reaffirm that
this is a religious nation."127 As a result, Congress would not—and
could not—pass a law contrary to the pervasive Christian character of
the nation. Any law that effectively barred the hiring of a minister of
the gospel had no authority. 128 Although judges and scholars would
subsequently criticize Brewer's Christian Nation opinion for its jingo-
istic tenor,'" it nevertheless represented the prevailing view about the
112 See 143 U.S. at 463.
119 See id. at 456-58. The Contract Labor Act of 1885 prohibited the importation of
foreigners into the United States under contracts of employment. See Act of 1885, ch. 164,
8 U.S.C. § 141 (repealed 1952).
120 Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 463.
121 See Green, supra note 117, at 445-46.
122 See Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 465-72.
123 Id
124 Id at 470-71.
126 Id.
1 ° Id. at 470.
127 Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 470.
122 /d at 470-71.
129 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,641 (1992) (referring to Holy Trinity as an aberra-
tion to the rule prohibiting "government sponsored endorsement of religion."); Lynch v.
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special status of religion under the law, one that frequently called for
distinctive treatment as against neutral regulations and programs."°
III. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NEUTRALITY
The purposes and values of the religion clauses, supported by the
historical record, indicate that evenhanded neutrality is, an in-
sufficient principle for the ordering of the Establishment Clause.
Simply put, neutrality is incomplete as a constitutional doctrine. First,
neutrality has no independent meaning or substantive value. Neutral-
ity is a means to a goal rather than a goal itself. Neutrality must there-
fore take its meaning from some other source." 1
The most obvious base-line for neutrality—the one identified by
the Court—is that of equality. But equality and neutrality are not
equivalent, as equality involves normative questions about the begin-
ning and ending positions of participants, asking whether they are or
should be similarly situated. Evenhanded neutrality, in contrast, is
concerned only with similar treatment, considered in isolation from
the starting and ending points. 152
 Also, some forms of equality are
more compelling than others. Discrimination among religions strikes
more deeply at the heart of Establishment Clause values—creating
impressions of government favoritism and inviting religious dissen-
sion—than distinctions between religion and non-religion.' In point
of fact, distinctions between religion and non-religion are consistent
with the language of the First Amendment and its apparent mandate
of distinctive treatment of religion. 1M Finally, the equality principle
grows in importance the less the government is involved in directing
policy outcomes or asserting its own position on issues, such as in an
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 717-18 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to Brewer's
declaration as "arrogant[]"); Green, supra note 117, at 427-29,
130
 The 1899 case of Bradfield u Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), is not to the contrary.
There, the Court upheld as against an Establishment Clause challenge a public grant to a
Catholic hospital for the construction of a medical ward. Id. at 299, 300. Contrary to first
impression, the Court did not base its holding on the theory that the religious hospital
could receive the grant under a neutral program made generally available to religious and
non-religious entities alike, but rather that the functions and legal character of the hospi-
tal were not religious. Id. at 298, 298.
131
 See Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality, supra note 21, at 998,
152
 See generally Brownstein, supra note 21, at 257-67; Forma4 Substantive, and Disaggre.
pied Neutrality, supra note 21, at 995-98.
153 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ('The clearest command of the Es-
tablishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another.").
134 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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open forum for private speech." Equality, therefore, can be an aspect
of neutrality, but the latter must still look to other values for its sub-
stantive meaning.
Accordingly, evenhanded neutrality is incomplete as a constitu-
tional doctrine because it fails to account for the other important val-
ues that inform the religion clauses, such as protecting religious lib-
erty and autonomy, ensuring religious (and secular) equality,
alleviating religious dissension, and protecting the legitimacy and in-
tegrity of both government and religion."6 A focus on neutrality,
however, discounts these values of liberty, equality, diffusion, and gov-
ernment integrity.
To be sure, evenhanded neutrality can be viewed as advancing
equality values by removing barriers to religious participation in gen-
erally available programs. Neutrality theory provides that individuals
and organizations should not be disabled from participating in gov-
ernment benefits programs simply because of their religious character
and states its goal as minimizing government influences on private
religious choices.'" Under this theory, the government violates neu-
trality when it requires religious individuals and organizations "to
shed or disguise their religious convictions or character" as the cost of
participating in general benefits programs.'" But as discussed, merely
resolving the issue of equal treatment fails to address the remaining
concerns of religious dissension and factionalism, government entan-
glement with religion, or the coercive element inherent in funding
programs.
Neutrality theory also aspires to the removal of government con-
straints on religious liberty."9 For the purposes of religious exercise,
however, the effect of the neutrality mandate has been less than be-
nign. Contrary to its billing, neutrality implies "that religion is virtu-
ally an irrelevancy" under the Constitution and, like race, is to be af-
135 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991). Compare Rosenberger v. Rector & Visi-
tors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995), with Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v.
Finely, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1978).
1" Brownstein, supra note 21, at 256-67 ("Equality and freedom of speech interests are
simply too essential a part of the constitutional framework relating to religion to be dis-
missed as irrelevant or secondary."); Lupu, supra note 46, at 360 (discussing the Religion
Clauses' "other animating concerns—to protect religious equality and to control religious
factionalism"); Sullivan, supra note 49, at 197-99.
137 See Esbeck, supra note 1, at 4-5; Underlying Unity, supra note 21, at 45; Formal, Sub-
stantive, and Disaggregated Neutraliiy, supra note 21, at 1001.
tse Esbeck, supra note 1, at 21.
MoNsmA, supra note 51, at 188-89; Esbeck, supra note 1, at 4-5
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forded protection only in those instances of purposeful discrimina-
tion.140
 Religious organizations and claimants are not exempt from
neutral laws of general applicability, even if their application has a
disproportionate impact on religious practice. 141
 Disparate impact of
neutral laws thus goes unremedied, regardless of the disquieting af-
fect on religious pluralism and practice. This is the distinct downside
to neutrality as the operative principle for the religion clauses. As Pro-
fessor Alan Brownstein has noted, those who advocate neutrality as
the be-all and end-all of religion clause jurisprudence have "traded
our constitutional birthright to engage in religious practices free from
government interference for the pottage of government subsidies."142
Granted, the neutrality principle does not bar all special treatment of
religion. Justice Scalia, author of Employment Division v. Smith and the
leading proponent of neutrality theory on the Court, would have al-
lowed the Texas Legislature to exempt religious magazines (and only
religious magazines) from state sales taxes as a permissible accommo-
dation of religion. 143
 But freedom from regulation via legislative lar-
gess provides little security for most religious organizations, particu-
larly those discrete and insular minorities with little access to the
political process. 144
IV. RECTIFYING THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN SEPARATION AND
NEUTRALITY
So what is the appropriate role for neutrality in Establishment
Clause adjudication and under what circumstances is neutrality effec-
tive? At the risk of sounding circular, neutrality is an important con-
sideration to the extent that it is not inconsistent with other Estab-
lishment Clause values. At the most immediate level, when a
controversy raises issues primarily involving religious equality, with few
other values implicated, then the neutrality of the program may be-
come dispositive. The most obvious example involves questions of ac-
cess to government owned speech forums and is represented by the
140 Conkle, supra note 21, at 25. See generally Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
141 See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
142
 Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Charitable Choke, in WELFARE RE-
FORM AND THE ROLE OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 248 (Davis ed., 1999); see also
Conkle, supra note 21, at 25.
143
 Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1'4 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 149, 15211.4 (1938).
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Widmar u Vincent,145 Lambs' Chapel u Center Moriches Union Free School
District, 146 and Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinettem line
of cases. Neither the purpose nor function of a truly open public fo-
rum suggests preference for any religious perspective or of religion
over non-religion. Neither is the government advancing any policy or
goal—other than enhancing free expression—nor seeking to use re-
ligious messages for its own purposes. Allowing religious access to
such a forum thus is unlikely to create religious dissension or compe-
tition, involve government influencing religious choices, threaten the
independence or autonomy of religious entities, compromise the in-
tegrity of either religion or government, or result in the accumulation
of power by religion, short of religion effectively capturing the fo-
rum.'" In such circumstances, the fact that the program is neutral in
application should be controlling.'"
A tax exemption for charitable organizations, including religious
entities, as represented in Walt u Tax Commission of New York City,150 is
another example where the scarcity of countervailing Establishment
Clause values makes neutrality more compelling. A generally available
exemption program, with a potentially unlimited number of partici-
pants, is unlikely to be perceived as favoring religion or to create re-
ligious dissension or competition.'" On the contrary, an exception
will likely lead to greater autonomy and independence of religious
entities, thus ensuring greater separation of the two spheres. 152 Coer-
cion and endorsement concerns are not completely removed but are
diffused by the general and indirect nature of the benefit. Neither is it
likely that a tax exemption will either create a dependency on gov-
ernment or corrupt religion in exchange for the benefit.'"
Conversely, the neutrality of a benefit program may not be effec-
tive where other Establishment Clause values are more dominant. For
example, suppose that the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
145 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
140 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
147 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
148 See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149 1n contrast, the neutrality of the access program at issue in Good News Club u Milford
Cent Sch. should not have been controlling due to the special nature of public elementary
schools with greater potential for appearances of official endorsement and subtle coercion
of impressionable school children. See 533 U.S. 98, 141-45 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting).
150 397 U.S. 669 (1970).
151 Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989); Wale, 397 U.S. at 673.
152 Watt, 597 U.S. at 674-75.
153
 Id at 675-76.
2002]	 Of Un(Equal) Jurisprudential Pedigree 	 1135
opment (HUD) decides to choose corporate and private partners for
a highly publicized housing development project in an urban center.
Assume the partners provide limited programmatic and service sup-
port for the project while they endorse the project's goals and priori-
ties. HUD uses a competitive process to choose representatives with
which to partner: a local bank; a local television or radio station; a
fast-food franchise; and a local church. Although the program is neu-
tral and evenhanded, it implicates values that may be unique in the
religion clause area, threatening religious factionalism and divisive-
ness over the selection of one church over others while potentially
compromising the church's integrity through its apparent endorse-
ment of HUD priorities and goals. The overall neutrality of the pro-
gram fails to defuse these concerns.
The neutrality of a program may also be more constitutionally
effective when the program involves individuals as opposed to institu-
tions. The Court has often distinguished between the appropriateness
of government aid to individuals in contrast to religious entities. 154
Everson v. Board of Education established this theme by holding that
private individuals could not be excluded "from receiving the benefits
of public welfare legislation ... because of their faith or lack of it." 155
This distinction makes sense as, absent the limited number of indi-
viduals who have selected a monastic lifestyle, people of faith are not
religious actors in all contexts or for all purposes. They can and do
shed their religious identity for a host of interactions and relation-
ships. The neutral provision of benefits to individuals would not nor-
mally implicate those religion clause values discussed above. In con-
trast, churches, synagogues, mosques, temples and other religious
institutions never shed their religious identities or purposes. The in-
clusion of religious institutions in direct grant programs thus impli-
cates Religion Clause values in ways that the inclusion of individuals
does not. 156
As a result, neutrality is less effective and clearly subordinate to
separationist values where a law or program risks religious factional-
ism and dissension through appearances of favoritism or competition
for government support or affection. Also, the more that the govern-
ment is involved in the initiation or operation of a program, and has
1" Compare Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983), and Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 244 (1968) (aid to individuals), with Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 621
(1988), and Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-64 (1975) (aid to religious institutions).
155 330 U.S. 1,16 (1947).
160 For a related discussion, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 46, at 82.
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greater interest in the outcomes or expressions of the program's
goals, then the less effective neutrality is in diffusing other Establish-
ment Clause goals.
It is within direct funding situations that neutrality is least effec-
tive as a constitutional principle. Under neutrality theory, so long as
the government program promotes overall secular goals and its
benefits are generally available to religious and non-religious entities
alike, then it is irrelevant whether a religious participant uses funds
for religious purposes. 157 But direct funding of religious entities as
part of a general program including secular participants—such as un-
der Charitable Choice—raises several establishment concerns not an-
swered by neutrality: government attribution of religious messages;
government impacting the religious choices of beneficiaries who re-
ceive their services via the religious provider; dependency of religious
entities on government; the potential of compromise of religious
voices to accommodate government policies; and threats to religious
autonomy through government regulation. In such circumstances,
other Establishment Clause values are dominant and should be dia-
positive of constitutionality.
CONCLUSION
The Court's recent Establishment Clause holdings have set up
neutrality and separationism as competing principles. So framed, neu-
trality and separationism have been placed on an apparent collision
course, forcing the justices and scholars to choose between one prin-
ciple or the other. Neutrality appears to be on the assent, though a
bare majority insists that the two principles are of equal jurispruden-
tial pedigree. The problem with this typology is that in its attempt to
157 As Esbeck describes it:
in neutrality theory, it makes no difference whether a provider is 'pervasively
sectarian' or whether the nature of the direct aid is such that it can be di-
verted to a religious use. Most importantly, the courts no longer need to en-
sure that governmental funds are used exclusively for 'secular, neutral, and
nonideological purposes,' as opposed to worship or religious instruction.
Neutrality theory eliminates the need for the judiciary to engage in such al-
chemy." .
Esbeck, supra note 1, at 37; see also id. at 17 n.68	 neutrality principle ... requires
only that the Court examine the outcome of the welfare program with an eye to determin-
ing whether the public purpose is being served by the social service provider. If so, then
the judicial inquiry is at an end, for the government has received full 'secular' value in
exchange for taxpayer funds.").
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shore-up separationist principles, it concedes that separationism and
neutrality are of co-equal value. This Article has argued to the con-
trary; neutrality—which has no substantive quality and takes its mean-
ing from other values—should be considered an adjunct to separa-
tionism. Neutrality should be controlling in Establishment Clause
cases only in the absence of countervailing religion clause values.
Only when neutrality is viewed in this subordinate role is it consistent
with the purposes and values that inform the religion clauses.
